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Introduction
It is easy to imagine that the present - yesterday’s 
tomorrow - was always the future expected in the past. Yet, 
what we now accept as the normal state of affairs - the 
present - was not the only possible outcome that could 
have come to pass nor was it often the most commonly 
expected one. What is now considered “inevitable” – 
when viewed from the vantage point of 20/20 hindsight - 
was often not immediately embraced or accepted. 
In order to understand where we are going it is important 
to understand where we have been and how we got there. 
I want to discuss some past visions of the future of financial 
markets, in general, and derivative markets, in particular, 
as seen by academics, practitioners and policymakers at 
various points in time. There are few advantages of age 
but one of them is the opportunity to witness changes 
and remember the contemporary context in which they 
occurred. I have been fortunate to have had a catbird seat 
to observe some of the changes in financial markets; first as 
a student of finance, and later with service: at a regulator; 
at an exchange; as a trader; in academia. I will draw upon 
some of my recollections and personal experiences in the 
discussion that follows.
Most readers have always lived in a world where 
exchange traded derivatives on financial assets existed. 
Many readers have always lived in a world where interest 
rate swaps and other over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
were important. Many readers have always lived in a world 
where exchange traded derivatives on energy, in general, 
and crude oil, in particular, existed and were important. 
Some readers have always lived in a world where large 
Asian financial and commodity futures markets existed and 
were important in the global price discovery process. Yet, 
this was not always the case.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1972 
2012 marked the 40th anniversary of the development of 
the first successful financial futures contracts.  On May 16, 
1972—trading on foreign exchange or FX futures began on 
the International Monetary Market (IMM) in Chicago. The 
IMM was established as an independent exchange and later 
became a division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). FX futures arose in part because small speculators 
had a difficult time trying to put short speculative FX positions 
on with the large banks that dominated the market.1
To be sure, FX futures had been introduced earlier but 
failed. The first FX futures contracts were introduced on April 
23, 1970 on the International Commercial Exchange (not to 
be confused with the present Intercontinental Exchange or 
ICE) in New York. Leo Melamed argued that the reason 
why the IMM-traded FX futures were successful was timing 
- the Bretton Woods Agreement and its system of fixed 
exchange rates had collapsed.2  
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1973 
It has been 41 years since the introduction of exchange 
traded equity options. On April 26, 1973, options trading 
in 16 listed stocks began on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE). According to the CBOE, 911 option 
contracts traded on opening day. Only call options were 
allowed to trade. Today, exchange traded equity options 
are an integral part of financial markets.
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What did the future look like in the past? Specifically, what 
did it look like for exchange traded equity options? There 
were a number of worries. One worry was that speculators 
would eschew trading in the cash stock market in favor 
of trading equity options. That is, a successful options 
market would cause trading volume on the stock market 
to dwindle as people traded options instead of stocks. The 
fundamental premise behind this fear - that option prices 
would be volatile while equity prices were stagnant reveals 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of options. 
Another fear at the time was that if trading in put options 
were permitted it would push down stock prices. This fear 
was powerful enough to cause the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to prohibit trading in put options for 
almost an additional 4 years. Thanks to this decision, put-
call parity in U.S. exchange traded equity options remained 
a theoretical concept during those four years. 
It is easy to imagine that exchange traded options began 
with the trading of equity options on the CBOE. However, 
it is important to note that exchange traded options did 
not begin with exchange traded equity options. Indeed, 
options on futures (“privileges”) were once common on U.S. 
commodity futures markets as Miller (1986) notes. However 
trading in “privileges” (futures options) was prohibited and 
then re-allowed in the U.S. in the 1980s. It is also important to 
recall that the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) created the 
CBOE.3 Put differently, the idea of exchange traded equity 
options originated at a futures exchange in Chicago. 
Given that the first successful financial futures contracts 
also originated in Chicago, there is also an important lesson 
about the nature of financial innovations—namely, they 
don’t always originate in financial capitals.
2013 also marked the 40th anniversary of the publication 
of the seminal article on option pricing by Fisher Black and 
Myron Scholes. This article is often rightly credited with both 
stimulating academic research and igniting the subsequent 
explosion in derivatives trading.  
The Black-Scholes article is also every Editor’s nightmare. 
It was rejected by many journals before it was finally 
accepted at the Journal of Political Economy. The 
seminal article by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes played 
a crucial role in stimulating the use, and study, of options. In 
a testament to the power of the wisdom of (trading) 
crowds, later studies showed that competitive markets 
reached similar prices even before the Black Scholes 
model was developed. For example, Moore and Juh 
(2006) report evidence that Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
traded “warrant prices were surprisingly accurate” during 
1909-1922.
Interestingly, in the mid 1980’s Merton Miller (1986) argued 
that the development of financial futures rather than 
exchange traded equity options was the most important 
financial innovation of the previous 20 years. The essence 
of Merton Miller’s argument is that the development of 
financial futures preceded the development of exchange 
traded equity options and that the success of FX futures 
contracts stimulated the development of futures contracts 
on numerous other financial instruments.
It is tempting to believe that all currently successful 
financial futures were an immediate success. However, 
they were not always immediately embraced. For instance, 
the Chicago Board of Trade introduced Treasury bond 
futures on August 22, 1977. The 30-year U.S. Treasury bond 
futures market traded around 4,000 contracts a day until 
early October 1979 when the Federal Reserve switched to 
targeting the quantity of money rather than interest rates. 
The ensuing volatility in interest rates that resulted from 
this central bank policy shift created a need for investors 
to manage interest rate risk exposure or face the risk of 
large avoidable losses. Essentially, volatile financial markets 
penalized those who failed to avoid risk by not hedging. 
In this sense, government and central bank policy played 
an important role in making financial futures successful by 
exacerbating financial market volatility.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1981 
It has been 33 years since the first interest rate swap was 
transacted in 1981 between the World Bank and IBM. This 
financial market took off quickly. In contrast, Eurodollar 
futures took longer to become successful even though they 
allow one to replicate interest rate swap positions. However, 
the need by swap dealers to hedge their net interest rate 
swap exposure helped make the Eurodollar futures market 
incredibly successful. It also stimulated active trading in 
deferred contract months--so much so that Eurodollar 
futures trading extended 10 years out into the future.  
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1980s 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) created the 
New York Futures Exchange (NYFE or “Knife”) in 1980 in 
an attempt to bring the financial futures business to New 
York. The introduction of stock index futures in 1982 pitted 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which traded futures 
contracts based on the S&P 500 stock index against the 
NYFE, which traded futures contracts based on a New 
York Stock Exchange index. Both started to trade at the 
same time in April 1982. It was not immediately clear which 
exchange would dominate stock index futures trading. 
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To be sure, the NYFE failed to attract much trading volume 
to its Treasury bond futures contract where it competed 
against the Chicago Board of Trade but that was an 
established market.4 Both markets traded futures in pits 
using open outcry.  Ultimately, Chicago won the battle and 
dominated financial futures trading in the U.S. Incidentally, 
Chicago would likely also have dominated U.S. equity 
options trading were it not for a SEC desire to regulate 
multiple option exchanges. The SEC ensured the existence 
of multiple options exchanges by dividing potential stocks 
for listed options among multiple exchanges rather than 
letting the Chicago Board Options Exchange dominate the 
nascent market.  
Both the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the 
Chicago Board of Trade recognized the potential demand 
for financial futures outside the U.S.A. However, they took 
two different approaches to it. The Chicago Board of Trade 
attempted to keep much of the business in Chicago by 
introducing evening pit trading to accommodate foreign 
order flow outside of normal Chicago business hours. The 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange established alliances with a 
number of non-U.S. futures markets including the Singapore 
International Monetary Market (SIMEX) where it entered 
into a mutual offset agreement for Eurodollar futures 
contracts traded on the two exchanges.  Mutual offset 
allowed traders to open a position in Eurodollar futures on 
one market and close it in the other market.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1982 
The London International Financial Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE) was formed in 1982.  It was established as an open 
outcry market. By 1996, after mergers with the London Traded 
Options Market and the London Commodity Exchange, 
LIFFE was the dominant futures market in Europe with its 
most important contract being German bund futures.  
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1983 
Looking back, 2013 also marked the 30th anniversary of the 
introduction of crude oil futures by the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX). Heating oil futures and gasoline futures 
had already been introduced by the NYMEX and were 
trading actively. However, many observers were skeptical 
whether the NYMEX could achieve similar success for crude 
oil futures given that several major oil companies (known 
as the “Seven Sisters”) dominated the spot oil market at 
the time. Indeed, some industry participants argued that 
they didn’t need crude oil futures to hedge and that they 
wouldn’t use the new futures contracts.  They were wrong. 
At the time, futures exchanges viewed energy as the 
last great-untapped commodity market. Both the Chicago 
Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
sought to wrest control of the energy futures markets from 
the NYMEX. They failed.  Just as the NYSE’s NYFE fought 
a losing battle to wrest control of financial futures from 
the Chicago markets, the Chicago futures exchanges 
fought a losing battle to wrest control of the energy futures 
markets from New York. Why did the NYMEX –an exchange 
whose most important futures contract less than a decade 
earlier was Maine potatoes--succeed and the far larger 
CBOT and CME fail? Was it a lack of resources?  No, both 
Chicago futures exchanges invested huge amount of 
money into making their energy futures markets successful. 
Their failure reflects the difficulty in attracting customer 
order flow from an existing liquid futures market. While it 
can be done as Holder, Tomas and Webb (1999) show, it is 
difficult to do.
I had a catbird’s seat from which to view the introduction 
of new futures contracts. I was trading as a local (i.e., 
independent trader) on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange at the time. The contract that I was principally 
trading was the S&P 500 stock index futures which opened 
later than the two energy contracts that the CME decided 
to introduce in 1984 —unleaded gasoline and no. 2 heating 
oil.  (The CME had obtained approval to trade crude oil 
futures but it held that contract in reserve to be introduced 
after CME gasoline and heating oil futures became 
successful.) To showcase the new energy futures markets, 
the CME decided to televise the opening live to a meeting 
of the American Petroleum Institute. Prior to the launch, 
the CME had a campaign to persuade locals to dedicate 
15 minutes a day to make the contracts successful by 
providing the liquidity needed to attract public order flow. 
Because the S&P 500 stock index futures opened later than 
the new energy futures markets, I decided to help make 
a market in unleaded gas and heating oil at the opening 
on the first day of trading.  
Unlike most futures markets where there is a burst of 
frenetic activity at the open and a cacophony of sound, 
there was dead silence when the new energy futures 
contracts opened for trading on the CME. All of us in the pit 
were staring at the board on the wall, which displayed real-
time prices from other futures markets waiting to see where 
NYMEX opened so that we could price the new futures 
contracts correctly. The market soon had a 21 tick spread 
for a one lot (or $84).  Needless to say, the NYMEX kept the 
gasoline and heating oil futures markets as trading volume 
soon withered on the CME.5
 05APPLIED FINANCE LETTERS | Volume 03 - ISSUE 01 | 2014
Yesterday’s Tomorrows:  Past Visions of 
Future Financial Markets
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1988 
2012 marked the 25th anniversary of the U.S. stock 
market crash of October 19, 1987.  2013 marked the 25th 
anniversary of the official Brady Commission report, which 
examined the nature and causes of the stock market crash. 
At the time, some observers blamed index arbitrage and 
portfolio insurance for the Crash. However, as the Brady 
Commission report showed index arbitrage was not the 
culprit.6 There was also significantly less portfolio insurance 
induced trades than there might have been as many of 
the human portfolio managers did not send the portfolio 
insurance program generated sell orders to the market. 
Despite the passage of considerable time, the causes of 
Crash remain unknown.7
One consequence of the ‘87 Crash is that it impacted 
how options are priced. After the Crash deep out-of-the-
money option prices reflected the leptokurtic nature of 
financial markets and the possibility of another crash. 
From an academic perspective, the ’87 Crash stimulated 
research applying extreme value theory to financial 
markets. The ‘87 Crash also stimulated research on 
behavioral finance as the assumption of market efficiency 
was called into question.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1990 
In 1988, the all electronically traded Deutsche Termin 
Boerse was founded by a number of German banks. It 
started to trade options and then futures in 1990. It offered 
a variety of financial futures contracts - on the German 
bund and other German securities and German stock 
indices. It was in head-to-head competition with the LIFFE 
over the German bund futures market and other futures 
contracts. It slowly acquired about one-third of the total 
market with LIFFE having the balance.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1997 
Electronic trading dominates today’s markets. Yet, 
the seemingly inevitable “electronic” future of futures 
trading took longer to dominate U.S. futures markets than 
expected.  The International Exchange or Intex - an all-
electronic exchange - was proposed in 1980. I attended 
a presentation that the founders made to staff at the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 1981. Although 
the founders initially intended it to be a U.S. regulated 
futures market, the exchange opened in Bermuda in 1984 
offering a raft of popular futures contracts that were traded 
on competing U.S. futures markets.  It failed.
When the electronic trading platform, Globex, was first 
introduced by the CME the French futures market, the Matif, 
accounted for most of the trading volume due to its heavy 
volume of after hours or “curb” trading. Perhaps surprisingly, 
options - the most complicated product to trade - remain 
the last area where pit trading is important in the U.S. 
For many years the all electronically traded Deutsche 
Terminboerse (DTB) had captured about a third of the 
market of bund futures market.  In the autumn of 1997, 
it captured about half of the trading volume with LIFFE 
capturing the balance.  And LIFFE’s share continued to 
fall. Electronic trading beat pit trading. This was the death 
knell for LIFFE bund futures. The dramatic collapse of pit 
trading on the Matif and the rapid loss of market share in 
bund futures by LIFFE to the DTB sent a shockwave of fear 
to traders in open outcry markets around the world. It was 
clear that the end of open outcry trading was near.  
The Sydney Futures Exchange (now part of the ASX) 
started to phase out open outcry in 1997 and went fully 
electronic on November 15, 1999. Why did the change 
occur in 1997 rather than 1990 when DTB was introduced? 
The key to understanding the rapid collapse of trading 
volume on the LIFFE is to recognize the importance of public 
order flow. Ignoring transaction costs, futures trading is a zero 
sum game. If there is no public order flow in an open outcry 
futures market the participants are simply picking each 
other’s pockets as every dollar won comes at the expense 
of someone else in the pit. If there is public order flow, then 
the pit community can profit from making a market for 
outside orders. Some observers estimate that between 30 
to 40% of all pit trading volume represents trading by locals 
trying to make a market. The sudden collapse of public 
order flow took with it much of that market.  
The key point is that electronically traded markets were 
not instantly successful in displacing open outcry markets. 
The dominance of the DTB in bund futures came after the 
German bank owners of the DTB were persuaded to send 
their orders to the DTB rather than the LIFFE.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 1998 -  
The Virtual Collapse of LTCM
The virtual collapse of LTCM in September 1998 was not 
a derivatives event per se but it did stimulate research 
on liquidity risk across the spectrum of financial markets. 
Interestingly, earlier examples of the failure of similar types 
of funds - such as the 1994 collapse of Askin Capital and the 
loss of $640 million - failed to impact academic research on 
liquidity risk. This contains an important lesson for academic 
researchers; namely, watch the financial markets.  
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Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 2003 
It has been 16 years since the all-electronically traded 
Deutsche Terminboerse merged with the Swiss Options 
and Financial Futures Exchange to form Eurex.  Electronic 
trading was the future. The U.S. futures markets still had 
a significant amount of trading occurring in the pits. Eurex 
was the future. The CBOT and CME were the past.  How long 
would pit trading in Chicago last?
It was 11 years ago that Eurex filed an application with 
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission to create 
a U.S. based electronic exchange. The objective was to 
compete directly with the largely pit traded Treasury futures 
contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). 
Everyone knew that open outcry trading in Chicago was 
doomed and Eurex USA would displace the Chicago Board 
of Trade (and later the CME).
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 2004 
It was 10 years ago that Eurex USA started to trade in 
February 2004. Yet, a funny thing happened en route to Eurex 
USA’s expected total domination of the U.S. Treasury futures 
markets. 2004 was not 1997. The CBOT fought back with 
lower fees (which illustrates the importance of transaction 
costs) and an electronic trading system of its own (where 
a large fraction of trades occurred). This last point was 
missed by many in the financial press who portrayed the 
battle as simply pit vs. machine.  Not surprisingly, Eurex USA 
was defeated.
Yesterday’s Tomorrow: 2004 
It has been almost 6 years since the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers during the depths of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). Derivative exchanges worked well during the 
GFC. None failed. However, uncertainty about the true 
size of credit default swap (CDS) positions of participants 
in the OTC derivatives market led to calls to change OTC 
derivatives trading. Credit default swaps (which by some 
accounts originated at JPMorgan in 1997) had grown to $62 
trillion in notional value by 2008. Concern over the potential 
for OTC traded credit default swaps to create systemic risk 
prompted calls for change.
In September 2009 leaders of the G-20 nations agreed 
that: “All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be 
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by 
end 2012 at the latest. OTC derivatives should be reported 
to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should 
be subject to higher capital requirements.”8
The G-20 decision to impose stricter rules on OTC 
derivatives trading bodes well for derivatives exchanges 
even if it is not yet fully implemented. However, one must 
distinguish between the future of derivative markets and the 
future of derivative exchanges.  Some potential challenges 
remain. Some observers argue that the large market 
capitalization of futures exchanges stems from a competitive 
advantage they enjoy from the lack of fungible futures 
contracts. Witness the sharp negative reaction of the CME 
stock price on February 5 and 6, 2008 to the announcement 
that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 
suggested a separation of the clearinghouse from futures 
exchanges.9
The Future of Derivative Markets
Electronic trading lessens the need for numerous physical 
derivatives exchanges. A number of exchanges have 
merged in recent years. Consolidation of exchanges should 
continue to occur. However, there are limits to this trend. 
Transnational mergers of derivative exchanges are difficult 
in some jurisdictions - as the failed 2012 bid for the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) by the Singapore Exchange 
(SGX) shows. 
Electronic trading has also increased the demand 
for physical proximity to exchange servers to reduce 
(exchange) latency. Frino, Mollica and Webb (2014) study 
the impact of the introduction of co-location on the ASX 
futures markets and report evidence showing that co-
location has increased futures market liquidity despite 
providing high frequency traders with only a small temporal 
advantage over those not co-located but with “real-time” 
access to exchange data.10
The Rise of Algorithmic and High Frequency  
Trading (HFT)
Electronic trading is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for high frequency trading. The rapid growth 
of algorithmic and high frequency trading has captured 
the attention of market participants, policymakers, and 
academics alike especially after the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash 
in U.S. equity markets. A joint SEC-CFTC report on the causes 
of the Flash Crash revealed that high frequency trading was 
not to blame for precipitating the Flash Crash but it also did 
little to stop it either.11 Rather, a 5 second trading halt on the 
CME stopped the downward spiral of futures prices and with 
it the Flash Crash.  
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Baron, Brogaard and Kirilenko (2014) examine the 
profitability of HFT firms in the CME e-mini S&P 500 stock index 
futures market over a two year period. They report evidence 
suggesting that HFT firms have exceptionally high Sharpe 
ratios. Put differently, HFT firms have exceptionally high 
returns with little if any risk. Interestingly, the most aggressive 
(i.e., liquidity taking) HFTs make substantially more profits 
than the passive (i.e., liquidity providing) HFTs. Moreover, the 
profits HFT firms make seem to persist over time. They also 
report evidence that only a few HFT firms make most of the 
profits.12 Although considerable attention is focused on the 
high speed of decision making by high frequency traders, 
Easley, Lopez de Prado and O’Hara (2012) point out that 
algorithmic trading is not dependent upon speed.13
Perceived problems with algorithmic and high frequency 
trading have led to a number of proposals on how to deal 
with the problems (if indeed they exist). It has also stimulated 
academic research in this area. Suggested solutions include 
taxes on messages, fees for cancelled orders, minimum 
resting order times to replacing continuous markets with 
high frequency periodic call markets. However, academic 
research is often an uneven predictor of how markets will 
evolve. The academic view of what is good for markets is 
not always what the market adopts and market participants 
appear to want. 
Conclusions
Derivatives exist because they are needed. They facilitate price discovery and risk transference. As long as markets 
are volatile the outlook for derivatives markets will remain strong. The evolution of financial markets will certainly continue 
as the needs of market participants and technology changes. However, as we have seen with many past visions of the 
future, Yesterday’s Tomorrows, our current perception of what financial markets will look like tomorrow, Today’s Tomorrow, 
may be a poor predictor of what tomorrow’s financial markets will actually look like and when seemingly inevitable 
changes will occur. 
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